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NOTES
FEDERAL COURTS-JURY TRIALS BEFORE
Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1979).
I.

MAGISTRATES-

INTRODUCTION

On October 16, 1970, Dr. Dolores Muhich was appointed an
assistant professor in the Department of Guidance and Educational
Psychology for Southern Illinois University.1 Her contract was to
last one year, but Dr. Muhich anticipated that it would be re
newed. In March 1971, however, she received a letter from the
department chairman stating that her contract would not be re
newed. After unsuccessful attempts to secure employment else
where, Dr. Muhich investigated the reasons for her dismissal. Sus
pecting that her dismissal and subsequent employment problems
stemmed from discrimination on the basis of her sex, Dr. Muhich
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Illinois. 2 After various pretrial motions at the district
court level, Chief Judge Wise referred the matter, upon the stipu
lation of the parties, to a United States Magistrate. 3 The magistrate
Brief for Appellant at 9, Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1979).
Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1249 (7th Cir.), rehearing and rehearing en
bane denied, No. 78-1817 (7th Cir. Sept. 25, 1979).
Muhich alleged that the defendants, officials at Southern Illinois University, act
ing under color of state law, had discriminated against her by reason of her sex, thus
denying her the equal protection of the laws according to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)
and the fourteenth amendment.
3. The order read as follows:
It is Ordered That, in accordance with Title 28 U.S.C. 636, Rule 38 of the
Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern Division of Il
linois, and pursuant to stipulation of the parties, this matter is referred to
United States Magistrate Kenneth J. Meyers, for the purposes of conducting
all proceedings, including trial and the entry of final judgment.
Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1249 (7th Cir. 1979). The basis of this order was the
Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1976), which provides: "(3) A magistrate
may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States. (4) Each district court shall establish rules pursuant to
which the magistrates shall discharge their duties." The local rule relied on in
Muhieh was Rule 38 of the District Court for the Eastern District of Illinois which
provides in pertinent part: "In addition to the other powers expressly provided by
Rule 38(b), the Magistrate shall have the authority to: (c) With the written consent of
the parties, hear and determine all motions, conduct the trial, enter findings of fact
and conclusions of law and final judgments in civil cases."
1.
2.
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was authorized to conduct all proceedings, including trial and entry
of final judgment. 4 The basis for the reference was the Federal
Magistrates Act of 19685 which empowers magistrates to assist
judges in an attempt to alleviate congestion in the federal court
system. While Congress did not expressly provide for magistrate
trials, it did allow magistrates to be assigned any additional duties
not inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United States.
As a result, a jury trial before Magistrate Kenneth J. Meyers was
held on February 28, 1978. The magistrate granted a directed ver
dict to members of the Board of Trustees of the University, and
the jury found in favor of the remaining defendants. 6 Magistrate
Meyers subsequently denied Dr. Muhich's motion for a new trial,
and she appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. 7
Nearly three months after trial, the magistrate filed the "Re
port and Recommendation" with the district court. On the basis of
a Seventh Circuit opinionS decided subsequent to trial, the magis
trate no longer considered his orders as final, appealable decisions
and he urged the court to "adopt and affirm the rulings and or
ders."9 On June 15, 1978, in Muhich v. Allen,10 the district court,
through Chief Judge Foreman, conducted a de novo review of the
record and the magistrate's report and affirmed both the magisThe Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1113, modified
the commissioner system to create the position of United States Magistrate. The
magistrate's purpose was to assist the judge in an effort to alleviate the problems of
delay and congestion in the federal courts. Magistrates were given express powers,
such as that of special master, and implied additional duties not inconsistent with
the United States Constitution and the laws of the United States. See Doyle, Imple
menting the Federal Magistrates Act, 39 J.B.A. KAN. 25 (1970); Spaniol, The Federal
Magistrates Act: History and Development, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J, 565.
In 1976 the Congress amended the Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1976) to clarify
the additional duties requirements. See notes 46-59 and accompanying text infra.
In 1979 the Congress has passed further amendments to the Act in the Federal
Magistrates Act of 1979. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 631-636 (West Pamph. 1980). See notes
143-52 and accompanying text infra. The purpose of the new Act is to clarify and ex
pand magistrate jurisdiction and to improve public access to the courts. Extensive
treatment of the 1979 Act is beyond the scope of this casenote. For extensive analy
sis see Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal
Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J, 1023 (1979).
4. See note 3 supra.
5. Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1976).
6. Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1249 (7th Cir. 1979).
7. Brief for Appellant at 8.
8. Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978); see note 17 infra.
9. Muhich v. Allen, 603 F.2d 1247, 1250 (7th Cir.), rehearing and rehearing en
banc denied, No. 78-1817 (7th Cir. Sept. 25,1979).
10. Civ. No. 73-770 (D. III. June 15, 1978), afI'd, 603 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir.), re
hearing and rehearing en banc denied, No. 78-1817 (7th Cir. Sept. 25, 1979).
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trate's orders and the jury verdict. 11
Dr. Muhich appealed to the Seventh Circuit alleging that
the district court's referral of her case to a United States Magistrate
for conducting a trial was void ab initio on jurisdictional grounds.
Also, she attacked the subsequent order by Judge Foreman as in
adequate to cure the allegedly invalid delegation. 12 The Seventh
Circuit held, over a strong dissent,13 that delegating a case to a
United States Magistrate for conducting a civil trial is proper when
both parties consent to the procedure pursuant to a local district
court rule. The court qualified its decision, however, and said that
the magistrate's findings must be subsequently presented before
the district court judge for de novo review of the evidence pro
duced at trial and the applicable law. 14 After this review, the
judge, rather than the magistrate, is entitled to enter final judg
ment.

II. BACKGROUND
The primary issue in Muhich was whether the adjudicatory
procedure used by the district court was statutorily and constitu
tionally infirm. The circuit court focused on serious issues raised by
Dr. Muhich concerning the jurisdiction of the magistrate under ar
ticle III of the United States Constitution and the failure of the
Federal Magistrates Act of 196815 to sanction magistrate references
for jury trials.
In prior opinions,16 the Seventh Circuit had consistently lim
11. In his order, Chief Judge Foreman stated, inter alia:
This case is before the Court to review the Report and Recommendation of
Magistrate Kenneth J. Meyers filed May 23, 1978. Neither party has filed ob
jections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, although more
than ten (10) days has elapsed since the Report and Recommendation was
served. The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation of the
Magistrate, the transcript of the proceedings, the various motions which
were filed during and subsequent to the trial, and the jury verdict. The
Court is convinced after having reviewed the entire record that the Orders
of the Magistrate and the jury verdict are supported by the evidence pre
sented and the law applicable thereto.
603 F.2d at 1250.
12. [d. at 1248-49.
13. Judge Swygert dissented on multiple grounds. See notes 34-45 infra and ac
companying text.
14. 603 F.2d at 1252. Judge Sprecher joined in the opinion written by Judge
Bauer.
The court dismissed, as without merit, appellant's additional argument that the
cumulative effect of erroneously admitted evidence and improper argument by de
fense counsel deprived Dr. Muhich of a fair trial. [d. at 1252-53.
15. See note 3 supra.
16. United States v. Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1979), cen. granted, 444
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ited the expansion of magistrate jurisdiction, even when based
upon consent of the parties. Dr. Muhich relied on dictum in the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Taylor v. Oxford,17 which apparently
limited the magistrate's trial jurisdiction. The Muhich court, how
ever, distinguished Taylor and expanded the magistrate's jurisdic
tion. The court decided to prohibit only the entry of final judgment
by magistrates. IS Since the district court judge in Muhich, rather
than the magistrate, had entered final judgment, jurisdictional re
quirements were satisfied. 19
The court also defended the Muhich procedure against the
claim that it violated the article III command that the judicial
power of the United States be vested in article III courtS.20 The
first half of the procedure consisted of a consensual reference to a
magistrate for a civil trial, and the second half of the procedure in
volved a de novo review by the district court. The first half of the
procedure had been previously recognized as constitutionally valid
in DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. 21 To support
the second half of the procedure, the Muhich court relied on the
United States Supreme Court's landmark decision of Mathews v.
Weber. 22 Mathews required that a magistrate exercising "additional
duties" jurisdiction must remain subject to the supervisory powers
of the district judge. 23 The authority and responsibility to make in
formed, final determinations, even when magistrates conduct the
proceedings, remain with the judge. 24 Since Chief Judge Foreman
retained jurisdiction by exercising his supervisory power in the
U.S. 824 (1979) (No. 79-8); Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978); TPO, Inc.
v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972).
17. 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978). In Taylor a different panel of the Seventh Cir
cuit invalidated local Rule 38 as it pertains to entry of final judgment by magistrates.
See note 4 supra. The court noted that while innovative experiments were intended
by § 636(b)(3) of the Magistrates Act, those experiments must stay within the admin
istrative limits of the statute. The court also indicated that consent alone cannot con
fer upon a magistrate jurisdiction which he otherwise does not possess. Id. at 154.
See also United Steelworkers, AFL-CIO v. Bishop, 598 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 1979).
18. 603 F.2d at 1250..
19. Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides: "The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority...."
21. 520 F.2d 499 (1st Cir. 1975), cen. denied, 423 U.S. 1073 (1976). See text ac
companying notes 63-75 infra.
22. 423 U.S. 261 (1976). In Mathews the Court unanimously held that the 1968
Magistrates Act permitted the district court to refer all social security benefit cases to
United States Magistrates for preliminary review, argument, and recommendation
subject to the independent decision on the record by the judge.
23. See note 3 supra.
24. 423 U.S. at 270-71.
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form of a de novo review and by invoking his exclusive authority to
order final judgment, the Muhich court concluded that the stric
tures of article III were satisfied. 25
The court in Muhich also rejected the plaintiff's claim that the
Magistrates Act failed to allow magistrates to conduct jury trials. It
found statutory support for such references in the broad language
of the "additional duties" that may be assigned to magistrates un
der the Act. 26 Since Dr. M uhich' s case was referred to the magis
trate according to a local rule 27 governing the discharge of the mag
istrate's duties,28 the referral was permissible.
As a final determination, the circuit court found no error be
cause the magistrate's decision received de novo review by the dis
trict court in compliance with section 636(b)(2)(C) of the Act. 29 Al
though Dr. Muhich had not filed formal objections against the
magistrate's report to the district court,30 Chief Judge Foreman re
viewed the record and entered judgment accordingly.31 The circuit
court commended Chief Judge Foreman on his exercise of discre
tion since this review precluded any possible constitutional infirmi
ties 32 and also satisfied the final judgment requirement. 33
25. 603 F.2d at 1251. The court contended that jurisdiction remains vested in
the district court and is merely exercised through the medium of the magistrate.
26. Id. at 1251.
27. Section 636(b)(4) requires that the district courts establish local rules, pur
suant to which the magistrates shall discharge their duties. The court placed reliance
on local Rule 38 despite its invalidation, in part, by the Taylor court. See note 17 su
pra.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(4) (1976). See note 3 supra.
29. Section 636(b)(I)(C) provides:
[T]he magistrate shall file his proposed findings and recommendations ...
with the court and a copy shall forthwith be mailed to all parties....
Within ten days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and
file written objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as
provided by rules of court. A judge of the court shall make a de novo deter
mination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may ac
cept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate. The judge may also receive further evidence or re
commit the matter to the magistrate with instructions.
28 U .S.C. § 636(b)(I)(C) (1976).
30. 603 F.2d at 1252. The court correctly observed that neither party formally
objected to the magistrate's report. Appeal of the trial findings commenced on April 7,
1978, three days after Magistrate Meyers denied the motion for a new trial. There
fore, Muhich objected, at least constructively, to any findings in the "Report and
Recommendation." Brief for Appellant at 8.
31. 603 F.2d at 1252.
32. Id. The court cited dictum in Sick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 574 F.2d 689,
692-93 (2d Cir. 1978), to illustrate that meaningful review avoids possible constitu
tional infirmities.
33. 603 F.2d at 1252. The court did provide room to modify this standard when
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Judge Swygert dissented from the Muhich majority on juris
dictional grounds and on the issue of legislative intent. Further
more, he contended that the review was not truly de novo. 34 The
thrust of his jurisdictional objection was against the judicial delega
tion to magistrates of the traditional article III function of presid
ing over jury trials. While acknowledging that Dr. Muhich had
consented to referring her case to the magistrate, Swygert negated
the importance of this consent. He said that parties cannot confer
subject matter jurisdiction themselves. 35
In discussing the essential subject matter jurisdiction, Judge
Swygert reviewed the Magistrates Act extensively to determine if
Congress had intended to confer upon magistrates the power "to
accept jurisdiction and preside over jury trials. "36 He referred to
the landmark case of TPO, Inc. v. McMillen 37 to provide an analy
sis of the Act prior to the 1976 amendments. In TPO, Inc., the
Seventh Circuit surveyed the legislative history of the 1968 Magis
trates Act, concluding that Congress had not attempted to devolve
upon magistrates powers which were judicial, such as motions to
dismiss or motions for summary judgment. Furthermore, the court
in TPO, Inc. said that judges also do not have the power to dele~
gate such duties to magistrates. 38 In holding that magistrates had
no authority to decide motions involving ultimate decision-making
power, the court emphasized that the additional duties assigned to
magistrates must remain within the bounds of what may be consti
tutionally performed by non-article III judicial officers. 39
Judge Swygert reviewed the 1976 amendments to the Magis
trates Act which clarified and defined the additional duties legis
countervailing constitutional considerations are present. [d. at 1251. Two examples
were given. The first occurs when, in a criminal case, the circumstances mandate
"extending the full measure of judicial power to the defendants." United States v.
Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.), cen. granted, 444 U.S. 824 (1979) (No. 79-8). In
Raddatz, the circuit court held that where the issue depended on the credibility of
witnesses, reference of the accused's motion to suppress evidence to a magistrate
with de novo review without hearing the evidence in question may have satisfied ar
ticle III, but did not satisfy due process. [d. at 982. The second example given oc
curs when parties to a civil litigation insist upon judicial resolution before an article
III court. LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). In LaBuy, the Supreme
Court disapproved the referral of a complex antitrust case to a special master by the
district judge after the judge had conducted the pretrial motions.
34. 603 F.2d at 1253.
35. [d. (Swygert, J.) (citing Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934); C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 17 (3d ed. 1976)).
36. 603 F.2d at 1253.
37. 460 F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1972).
38. [d. at 359.
39. [d.
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latively assignable to magistrates. 4o He concluded that Congress
had intended for these additional duties to be merely administra
tive and to enable the district court judge to have more time to pre
side at trial. 41 Congress never contemplated that the amendments
would be considered "as authoriZing a magistrate to do all but en
ter final judgment in a federal civil trial. "42 He contended that the
procedure followed in Muhich contradicted the congressional in
tent.
Judge Swygert also argued that even if Congress had sanc
tioned such magistrate reference, the de novo review conducted in
Muhich did not satisfy constitutional requirements 43 since it was
not truly de novo. 44 Instead of an independent weighing of each
situation as it existed prior to the ruling, Chief Judge Foreman
merely reviewed the record to find evidence supporting a given
conclusion. By allowing the magistrate to preside over a jury trial
on the merits, Judge Swygert stated that the review could be
scarcely other than a broad appellate review. Because the jury's
verdict is not lightly set aside and because the judge may be reluc
tant to re-try the entire case, the result is often merely a review to
determine if the magistrate's rulings were arguably supportable. 45
Consequently, Swygert stated, even if a true de novo review could
cure constitutional defects, such a review was not present in the
Muhich case.

III. THE MAGISTRATES ACT OF 1976
Judge Bauer explains that the Federal Magistrates Act, as
amended in 1976, supports the majority's decision. 46 Contrary to
40. H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in [1976] 5
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 6162.
41. Id. at 6, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6166. The
report states:
It seems to the committee that in 1968 the Congress clearly indicated its
intent that the magistrate should be a judicial officer whose purpose was to
assist the district judge to the end that the district judge could have more
time to preside at the trial of cases having been relieved of part of his duties
which required the judge to personally hear each and every pretrial motion
or proceeding necessary to prepare a case for trial.
Id.
42. 603 F.2d at 1254.
43. See notes 60-130 infra and accompanying text.
44. Judge Swygert defined de novo as the "independent weighing of each situ
ation as it existed at the time prior to a given ruling ... with an independent judg
ment reached and then matched against that made by the magistrate." 603 F.2d at
1255.
45. [d.
46. Id. at 1252.
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the majority's assertions, however, the 1976 amendments to the
Magistrates Act did not expressly sanction the procedure allowing
magistrates to preside over federal civil trialS. 47 The purpose of the
1976 amendments was to clarify and further define assignable addi
tional duties after numerous judicial setbacks to magistrate expan
sion. 48 The congressional intent, rather than abnegating judicial
power, was for the magistrate to assist the district court. 49 For ex
ample, by assisting the judge in pretrial and preliminary matters,
the magistrate would facilitate "the ultimate and final exercise of
the adjudicatory function at the trial of the case. "50 The mandate
was clear that magistrates would facilitate the adjudicatory process
by relieving judges of some non-article III functions, but not the
central duty of presiding at trials. 51
Absent any clear legislative support52 for magistrate jury trials,
the majority was forced to rely on the broad language of section
636(b)(3)53 of the Act which shows a congressional intent to dele
gate to magistrates additional duties not inconsistent with the Con
stitution or laws of the United States. The 1976 amendments en
courage the district courts to continue innovative experiments54
47. Subsequent to Muhich, however, Congress expanded the jurisdiction of
magistrates to include their presiding at civil trials upon the consent of the parties.
See note 3 supra.
48. See H.R. REP., supra note 40, at 2, 5, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6162, 6165. The Report expresses the congressional intent to
overrule the holdings in several restrictive cases. See Wingo V. Wedding, 418 U.S.
461 (1974) (magistrate could not hold evidentiary hearing in a habeas corpus pro
ceeding; a judge must preside); Ingram v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1268 (6th Cir. 1972)
(no power in magistrate to review the Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare de
nial of social security benefits and to make proposals to district judges on the facts
and the law); TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d at 348 (motion to dismiss).
49. H.R. REP., supra note 40 at 7, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS at 6167.
50. Id.
51. See United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 576 F.2d 852, 853 (8th Cir. 1978)
(purpose of Magistrates Act was to provide a method to relieve judges of some of
their non-article III functions); Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d at 154 (adjudicatory power
over dispositive motions was to be executed only by judges); 460 F.2d at 359 (sec
tion 636(b) cannot be read in derogation of the fundamental responsibility of judges
to decide the cases before them).
52. The Muhich court, by implication, indicated the lack of legislative support
by failing to allude to legislative history. 603 F.2d at 1251.
53. Id. at 1251-52.
54. "If district judges are willing to experiment with the assignment to magis
trates of other functions in aid of the business of the courts, there will will be in
creased time available to judges for the careful and unhurried performance of their
vital and traditional adjudicatory duties . . . ." H.R. REP., supra note 40, at 12, re
printed in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6172. The Taylor court while
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unrestricted by other specific grants of authority to magistrates.
The examples given, however, are merely administrative,55 and not
adjudicatory responsibilities. This assignment of additional duties is
to aid judges in the administrative functions of the courts rather
than to replace them in their traditional functions. 56 Section
636(b)(4)57 requires the district court judges to establish rules gov
erning these additional duties. While the Muhich court relies on
this section58 to validate the reference under the existing Local
Rule 38, Congress simply intended this section to give notice to lit
igants or to equalize magistrate workloads rather than to expand ju
risdiction to magistrates. 59 Consequently, Judge Swygert is correct
in his conclusion that the Magistrates Act of 1976 does not ex
pressly sanction civil trials by magistrates. Therefore, before this
adjudicatory procedure may be implied from the Act, it is neces
sary to determine whether the procedure is consistent with article
III of the United States Constitution.
IV.

THE CONSTITUTION

Article III of the United States Constitution requires that the
judicial power of the United States be exercised by article III
judges. 60 While some delegation of power to non-article III judges
has been approved,61 this delegation must not be so excessive as to
constitute an abnegation of the judicial power. 62 In Muhich, the
interpreting this language stated that "[i]nnovative experiments may be admirable,
and considering the heavy caseloads in the district courts, understandable, but exper
iments must stay within the limitations of the statute." 575 F.2d at 154.
55. H.R. REP., supra note 40, at 12, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS at 6172.
This subsection (636(b)(3)) would permit, for example, a magistrate to re
view default judgments, order the exoneration or forfeiture of bonds in crim
inal cases, and accept returns of jury verdicts where the trial judge is un
available. This subsection would also enable the court to delegate some of
the more administrative functions to a magistrate....

ld.
56. ld.
57. See note 3 supra.
58. 603 F.2d at 1251.
59. H.R. REP., supra note 40, at 13, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS at 6173.
60. See 603 F.2d at 1251. See generally Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
561 (1962); Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II: The American Analogue, 50
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297, 1304 (1975).
61. Section 636(b)(I)(A) permits magistrates to hear pretrial matters with stated
exceptions. Subsection (B) permits evidentiary hearings and motions for post trial re
lief to be held by the magistrate. See also note 88 infra.
62. Hill v. Jenkins, 603 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979); Reed v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 459 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1972).
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Seventh Circuit held that the delegation of trial jurisdiction to
Magistrate Meyers was within the realm of judicial authority. The
court relied on the voluntary consent of the parties and a properly
administered de novo review to support its assertion that constitu
tional requirements were satisfied. 63 There are potential problems,
however, both legal and practical, which influence the constitution
ality and desirability of such delegations in Muhich and in future
applications. These problems include the validity and voluntariness
of the consent given, the actual scope of the de novo review, and
the integrity of the judicial system itself.
A.

Consent

Courts have differed in their analysis of exactly how consent
by the parties enlarges the trial jurisdiction of magistrates. Some
courts have considered trials before magistrates as an extension of
the parties' right to consent to adjudication before a forum other
than an article III court. 64 It is not disputed that parties have the
freedom, without violation of article III, to consent to adjudication
by an arbitrator. 65 This approach, however, has not been widely
accepted since the magistrate is not part of a private dispute reso
lution process, but rather is a judicial officer in the public aegis of
the United States district court system. 66 As a part of this frame
work, the public maintains an interest in the controversy from a
precedential viewpoint, quite unlike the private nature of arbitra
tion in which decisions are not necessarily used as a basis from
which to decide subsequent issues.
Magistrate trial jurisdiction also may be invoked under the
consent provision of section 636(b)(2) which allows magistrates to
serve as special masters. 67 Congress has expressly given litigants an
option of choosing a magistrate to serve as a specialized factfinder

63. See notes 64-126 infra.
64. 520 F.2d at 505. See Gelfgren v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 451 F. Supp.
1229 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (the constitution does not prevent references to magistrates
for final judgment any more than it prevents the parties from choosing binding arbitra
tion). See also Comment, Adjudicative Role for Federal Magistrates in Civil
Cases, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 584 (1973).
65. See Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344 (1854); Butler Products Co. v. Unistrut
Corp., 367 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1966).
66. 603 F.2d at 1251, 1253.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1976). In Sick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 574 F.2d 689
(2d Cir. 1978), the court assumed that the reference was properly made to a magis
trate as a special master and that the jury trial was proper after the parties consented.
ld. at 689-90.
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when the parties consent. 68 While a previous limitation69 on the
use of special masters was abolished by the 1976 Magistrates Act, 70
there do remain serious restrictions on their use. Congress in
tended that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, other than Rule
53(b) in special circumstances,71 would apply to references to mag
istrates serving as masters. Rule 53 contains "many important rules
governing the powers of masters, the conduct of proceedings be
fore them, and the submission of reports. "72 For example, Rule
53(e)(4) commands that the effect of a master's report is the same
regardless of whether the parties have consented to the referral. 73
Therefore, while consent can invoke magistrate jurisdiction as a
special master, it cannot relieve a magistrate of limitations imposed
upon him when acting as a judge.
The most prolific use of consent to gain jurisdiction has been
the consensual reference of magistrates under the additional duties
section of the Magistrates Act. 74 Consensual reference as a basis for
supplying magistrates with trial jurisdiction received strong support
in DeCosta. 75 There, the court held that parties may consent to
having a magistrate preside over a jury trial and make an initial de
cision subject to district court review if one party contends that the
magistrate's decision is clearly erroneous. 76 DeCosta has been cited
with general approval by the courts,77 Congress 78 and commenta
68. There are, however, limitations to a reference under this section. For exam
ple, magistrates cannot enter final judgments. Kendell v. Davis, 569 F.2d 1330 (5th
Cir. 1978).
69. In La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259 (1957), the Supreme
Court held that references to special masters were justified only in "exceptional cir
cumstances." FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b).
70. See H.R. Rep., supra note 40, at 12, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS at 6172.
71. The Congress exempted Rule 53(b) when the parties consent under 28
U.S.c. § 636(b)(2) (1976). The exception is a legislative overruling of the restrictive
decision in La Buy V. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
72. H.R. REP., supra note 40, at 12, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS at 6172.
73. See Duryea V. Third Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 602 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1979).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1976). See generally Silberman, supra note 60; Note,
Federal Magistrates and the Implications of Consensual References, 4 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 129 (1975); Comment, supra note 64; Note, supra note 3.
75. 520 F.2d at 499.
76. [d. at 508.
77. Horton V. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403, 404 (1st Cir. 1979);
Small v. Olympic Prefabricators, Inc., 588 F.2d 287, 292 (9th Cir. 1978). But cf.
Taylor V. Oxford, 575 F.2d at 154 n.5 (consent of the parties is provided for in the
statute only for special masters indicating that Congress considered consent favor
able in one situation but not in other circumstances).
78. See S. 1613, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).

534

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:523

tors.79 The Muhich court also relied on DeCosta. In effect, how
ever, it departed from DeCosta in several significant respects, 80
with the major difference being the scope of the consensual refer
ence. DeCosta expressly prohibited even a clearly worded consen
sual reference that purported to bind the parties finally to the mag
istrate's rulings of law. 81 Dr. Muhich consented to precisely that
which DeCosta prohibits, entry of final judgment by a magistrate.
The Muhich majority found significance in the initial consent and
chose to disregard the invalid portion of the reference. 82
By exceeding the scope of DeCosta, the court in Muhich indi
cates a strong preference faVOring expansion of the magistrate's role
once the parties have given their initial consent. Another indication
of this judicial preference is found in the court's reliance on Local
Rule 38 which provides for the delegation of jury trials to magis
trates. 83 These local rules are promulgated by the district court
judges in an attempt to alleviate their trial burdens when litigants
are willing to consent to magistrates as a substitute. Consent appar
ently mitigates the infirmities behind excessive delegation84 and
judges have increasingly employed this waiver.85 There are, how
ever, important limitations on consent as the basis of subject mat
ter jurisdiction. Judge Swygert's contention that consent cannot
cure or waive subject matter jurisdictional requirements has re
ceived some support,86 but this argument has been discounted
by one commentator who asserts that article III rights can be
79. See H.R. REP., supra note 40, at 12, reprinted in [1976] 5 U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS at 6172.
80. The Muhich court recognized that magistrates are judicial officers within
the control of the district judge. 603 F.2d at 1251. The Decosta court erroneously an
alyzed consensual reference as though it presented a litigant a choice between two
tribunals with overlapping jurisdiction, rather than between two adjudicators of the
same tribunal. See Note, supra note 3, at 147 n.132.
81. 520 F.2d at 408.
82. 603 F.2d at 1250.
83. [d. at 1251.
84. "Consent partially safeguards the individual's interest in neutral and expert
adjudication and it seems to preserve his right to ... a "trial before a tenured adjudi
cator. At the same time, it relieves judges of part of the onus of engaging in a 'juris
diction' balancing of values prior to reference." Note, supra note 3, at 1049.
85. In 1978, 540 civil trials were conducted by magistrates pursuant to consent
by the parties, representing a 66.2% increase over the number of trials conducted by
magistrates in 1977. [1978] AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 138 (table 69). In 1979,
570 civil trials were conducted by magistrates. [1979] AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP.
10 (table 10).
86. See H.R. REP. No. 1364, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4, 38 (1978) (dissenting
views of Rep. R. Drinan and Rep. T. Kindness).
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waived. 87 A more significant limitation on consent has been the in
ability to confer jurisdiction on magistrates to enter final judgments
appealable directly to the courts of appeals. 88 Parties may consent
to initial decisions by magistrates, but the courts have applied
Mathews to preclude delegation of such a fundamental and exclu
sive article III power as the entry of final judgment by magistrates.
This judicial reluctance to delegate final judgment authority dem
onstrates one area in which consent is generally inadequate in
conferring subject matter jurisdiction.
Regardless of the validity of consent in conferring jurisdiction,
there are pressures from the system which adversely influence the
voluntariness of consent. Litigants may not want, nor be in a posi
tion,89 to wait two to three years for a judge when a magistrate is
available for trial within three months. 90 There are also internal
pressures influencing consent. As explained previously,91 there is a
strong judicial preference to use magistrates in expanded ways. 92
87. Silberman, supra note 60, at 1350-51. In support the author states:
[N]othing in the first section of article III, which vests the judicial power
of the United States in the courts and provides for life tenure of judges, in
separably links the exercise of particular subject matter jurisdiction set up in
that article, to the presiding officer. It is the court, not the judge, to which
doctrines of subject matter jurisdiction apply. Thus, the Constitution sup
plies no subject matter jurisdictional provision barring magistrates from
exercising article III judicial power with the parties' consent.
Id.

88. Harding v. Kurco, Inc., 603 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1979); Horton v. State St.
Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403 (1st Cir. 1979); Small v. Olympic Prefabricators,
Inc., 588 F.2d 287 (9th CiT. 1978); Cason v. Owen, 578 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1978);
Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978); Sick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 574 F.2d
689 (2d Cir. 1978); Swanson & Yongdale, Inc. v. Seagrave Corp., 542 F.2d 1008 (8th
Cir. 1976). See note 143 infra. But see Gelfgren v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 451
F. Supp. 1229, 1330 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (district judge allowed entry of final judgement
by the magistrate).
89. Also, there has been concern that magistrates might become poor people's
judges. See Note, supra note 3, at 1052 nn. 61-63.
90. Telephone conversation with the office of United States Magistrate
Kenneth J. Meyers. These figures are indicative of the congestion in the federal
court system. There were over 19,089 civil cases pending over three years on June
30, 1979, representing an all time high. 1979 AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 81-83
(table 39).
91. See note 83 supra.
92. [1979] AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 11.
United States magistrates now assist the district judges in expediting
civil and criminal litigation in the great majority of the 92 district courts cov
ered by the Federal Magistrates Act. During the 12-month period ended
June 30, 1979, for example, magistrates in 74 districts filed written reports
and recommendations for disposition of 12,062 prisoner petitions. Magis
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Local Rule 38 employed in Muhich is similar to previous attempts
to delegate final judgment authority to magistrates. While each of
these previous attempts has been invalidated as excessive,93 the
policies behind the rules clearly show that district court judges rely
on magistrates to a large extent and that the judges are not hesitant
to delegate even traditional functions such as trial jurisdiction.
Another pressure influencing the voluntariness of consent is
the potential for subtle coercion by the judiciary to encourage con
sent in an attempt to either promote judicial economy94 or avoid pre
siding over certain types of litigation. 95 The DeCosta court suggested
a procedure to insulate the identities of the parties after realizing
that a harried court might subtly coerce parties to consent to a trial
by magistrate. 96 A by-product of the coercion problem is that judges
may unintentionally become predisposed against a nonconsenting
litigant, which could adversely influence the result in a close case.
The Muhich opinion failed to discuss the need for these safeguards,
unjustly assuming that there would be complete voluntariness on
trates conducted 24,231 civil pretrial conferences for the judges in 77 dis
tricts. In 77 districts they reviewed 34,311 motions in civil cases, of which
4,361 were dispositive matters in which magistrates submitted full reports
and recommended decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I)(B). In addition,
magistrates filed reports and recommendations on 4,074 social security ap
peals in 68 districts.
Id. Thi's trend is especially true when the parties consent since the court is relieved
from the jurisdictional balancing before referring the matter to a magistrate. See note
83 supra. Moreover, the influx of local rules promulgated by the district judges,
which give magistrates unlimited discretion, indicate the confidence that district
judges have in these magistrates. Harding v. Kurco, Inc., 603 F.2d 813 (10th CiT.
1979); Horton v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403 (1st CiT. 1979); Small v.
Olympic Prefabricators, Inc., 588 F.2d 287 (9th CiT. 1978); Cason v. Owen, 578 F.2d
572 (5th CiT. 1978); Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th CiT. 1978); Sick v. City of
Buffalo, N.Y., 574 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1978); Swanson & Yongdale, Inc. v. Seagrave
Corp., 542 F.2d 1008 (8th CiT. 1976).
93. See note 92 supra.
94. TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 360 n.62 (7th CiT. 1972) (the danger
of coerced consent is real); United States v. Eastmount Shipping Corp., 62 F.R.D.
437, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (judge expressed suprise and regret over Department of
Justice rule stating that "neither calendar congestion nor complexity of an issue in
volved justifies reference of a case to a special master"); see Comment, supra note
64, at 587-88 (suggesting incentives to gain consent).
95. See Note, supra note 3, at 1052. (1979 house bill required case by case ref
erence decisions to insure that district courts will not stigmatize categories of liti
gants as undeserving of the attention of article III judges).
96. 520 F.2d at 507 (suggesting a "blind" procedure "requiring that parties file
with the clerk of the court a letter of consent to have a magistrate render a decision
in the case with the clerk being bound not to disclose the identity of any who
consent or who withhold consent."). See H.R. REP. No. 287, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31
(1979) (dissenting view of Rep. E. Holtzman).
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the part of the parties. Instead, the court relied on the availability
of de novo review as an adequate safeguard to solve any procedural
deficiencies which may arise. 97
B.

De Novo Review

The United States Supreme Court has clearly mandated that
the authority and responsibility for informed and final determina
tions must remain with the judge. 98 Thus, the Muhich court prop
erly recognized the necessity of conducting a review as a method
to correct possible improper rulings and to avoid constitutional dif
ficulties. 99 The critical issue in Muhich, however, involves not the
availability of de novo review, but rather the nature and scope of
Chief Judge Foreman's actual review in the district court.
In the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act, Con
gress redefined de novo review as it pertains to judicial review of
magistrate findings. 10o Congress did not intend for a de novo re
view to require the judge actually to conduct a new hearing on
each contested issue. Rather, the district court judge, in making
his determination, was directed to give fresh consideration to those
issues to which specific objection had been. made. 101 In Muhich,
Magistrate Meyers filed a report which became the focus of the de
novo review. His findings and recommendations carried only such
97. For example, note the court's reliance on de novo review to cure the par
tially invalid local rule. See note 17 supra.
98. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 269-70 (1976).
99. 603 F.2d at 1250 (citing Sick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 592 F.2d 689, 692-93
(2d Cir. 1978)).
100. H.R. REP. supra note 40, at 30, reprinted in (1976) 5 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS at 6163.
101. Id: The report adopted to a great extent the approach used in Campbell v.
United States Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 879 (1974).
In Campbell, the court stated:
If neither party contests the magistrate's proposed findings of fact, the court
may assume their correctness and decide the motion on the applicable law.
The district court, on application, shall listen to the tape recording of the ev
idence and the proceedings before the magistrate and consider the magis
trate's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court shall
make a de novo determination of the facts and the legal conclusions to be
drawn therefrom. Finally, the court may accept, reject or modify the pro
posed findings or may enter new findings ....
501 F.2d at 206-07.
The cases are in harmony with the view that the district courts must review the
magistrate's record de novo, but the scope of that review is unclear. One case sug
gests that this might vary depending upon the expertise of the magistrate and other
circumstances when no formal objection has been filed. Webb v. Califano, 468 F.
Supp. 825 (E.D. Cal. 1979) (objection filed after a ten day statutory period).
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weight as their merits warranted under the discretion of Chief
Judge Foreman. The judge considered these findings under the
standard requiring them to be supported by the evidence and law
applicable thereto before entering final judgment for the defen
dants. On appeal, the Muhich majority was satisfied that the extent
of this de novo procedure' was sufficient under the Federal Magis
trates Act's guidelines.
Judge Swygert's dissenting opinion that the same de novo re
view upheld by the majority was a mere rubber stamp102 illustrates
the real dangers inherent in this de novo procedure. There are
pressures influencing the independence of a district court judge's
review which place him in a precarious position. If he chooses to
disregard the magistrate's recommendation, he may be required to
hear witnesses personally to insure the integrity of the fact-find
ing process. loa But if he conducts too extensive a review, judicial
economy is sacrificed. 104 Conversely, the judge may hesitate to dis
turb the factfinder without such an extensive review since jury de
cisions are not to be lightly set aside. 105 The result is a strong pos
sibility that the de novo review becomes merely a search for
evidence in support of the magistrate's given conclusion, rather
than an independent search for the proper conclusion. While the
Supreme Court has rejected this assumption,106 several cases indi
cate that the possibility of a cursory or even no review is quite
real. 107 The Seventh Circuit has already remanded a case for abuse
of a district court judge's discretion in applying the Muhich stan
102. 603 F.2d at 1253. Judge Swygert contended that the judge failed to exer
cise a de novo review but in fact "devolved it upon the magistrate and retained
merely the power to conduct an administrative, appellate review in the broadest
sense." Id. at 1255. Cf. Noorlander v. Ciccone, 489 F.2d 642, 648 (8th. Cir. 1973)
(judge will personally take testimony of witnesses and determine credibility on de
novo review of material issues of fact.)
103. In United States v. Bergera, 512 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1975), the Ninth Cir
cuit held that the district court erred when it set aside the magistrate's recommenda
tion and ruled on the motion to suppress without hearing the evidence of the motion
itself. Id. at 394. Judge Cambers, dissenting, rejected the court's proposition, stating
that "if the district judge wants to approve the magistrate, he may stamp it 'ap
proved', but if he doubts the wisdom he must conduct a hearing de novo." Id. at 395.
See also United States v. Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.), cen. granted, 444 U.S.
824 (1979) (No. 79-8).
104. Webb v. Califano, 468 F. Supp. 825, 830-31 (E.D. Cal. 1979) (de novo may
become counterproductive if required too often).
105. 603 F.2d at 1255.
106. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. at 274 ("we categorically reject the sug
gestion that judges will accept, uncritically, the recommendation of magistrates.")
107. See note III infra.
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dards. In Hill v. Jenkins, 108 the district court judge referred to a
magistrate the task of conducting evidentiary hearings at a prison.
These hearings, in effect, became a trial on the merits when argu
ments were heard from both sides. The case was remanded be
cause the judge adopted verbatim the findings of fact and conclu
sions of law without even the benefit of the transcript. 109 Hill
demonstrates that district court judges may automatically presume
that the magistrate's findings are correct. Relying on this presump
tion, some judges have occasionally neglected to conduct reviews,
even over the objection of the parties. 110 These abnegations of
judicial power, however, have consistently been invalidated by
higher courts. 111
A second major problem frequently associated with the admin
istration of the de novo review is the lack of any real access to an
article III judge. 112 The district court judge does retain jurisdic
tion, but it "is . . . exercised [indirectly] through the medium of
the magistrate. "113 Whenever the parties consent to referral to a
magistrate, the magistrate assumes complete control of the entire
proceedings. The judge, in effect, remains insulated114 from the lit
igants but for the official record. As a result, the judge serves es
sentially an appellate function, while the verdict itself is shaped by
the immediate events occurring before the magistrate. 11S Chief
108. 603 F.2d at 1256. The district judge adopted the findings of appellee
prison officials, rather than the magistrate, since no report and recommendation was
ever filed. Material deficiencies also included the lack of consent to the procedure
and the absence of a local rule permitting a magistrate to preside over civil trials. [d.
at 1258-59.
109. [d. at 1258.
110. Orland v. United States, 602 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1979) (where federal pris
oner filed written objections to magistrate's report the district court erred in not mak
ing a de novo determination of contested findings).
111. Reed v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 459 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1972). The
court held that court approval of a magistrate memorandum which transformed pre
liminary hearing into a case on the merits was an abnegation of judicial authority en
tirely contrary to the provisions of article III. See also Rainha v. Cassidy, 454 F.2d
207 (1st Cir. 1972).
112. See text accompanying notes 121-126 infra for a discussion of the prob
lems associated with the lack of access to an article III judge.
113. 603 F.2d at 1251 (quoting TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 353 (7th
Cir. 1972)).
114. In Horton v. State St. Bank, 590 F.2d 403 (1st Cir. 1979) the court, in dis
cussing final judgment by magistrates, stated "we cannot overlook the pressures to
acquiesce in this procedure which could develop over time, thereby effectively
depriving litigants of trials before an Article III court." [d. at 404. See 460 F.2d at
361 n.67 (dual role imposed on judges). See generally Note, supra note 3, at 1051-55.
115. 603 F.2d at 1255. (events are controlled in. a significant part by the magis
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Judge Wise, when referring the case to Magistrate Meyers, recog
nized the importance that testimony of the parties' credibility
would assume in the case's outcome since crucial facts were in
dispute.1l6 Testimony of witnesses presented in the official record
may give impressions contrary to those derived from personal ob
servations.1l7 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that proce
dures used at trial may be as important as the substantive law in
influencing a decision.llS In Muhich, however, Chief Judge Fore
man did not actively participate in the adjudication of the matter.
Instead, Magistrate Meyers presided over the trial and made deci
sions which influenced the outcome.1l9 While the de novo record
review theoretically served as a check to insure the compliance
with the evidence and law adduced at trial,120 the lack of real ac
cess to an article III judge indicates a serious limitation dimin
ishing the effectiveness of this bifurcated procedure.

C.

Integrity. of the Judicial System

A major issue not addressed in the Muhich opllllon concerns
the effect of magistrate trials on the overall integrity of the judicial
system. 121 Constitutional reservations have been expressed at each
trate's rulings). Judge Levin, in Senate Hearings for the 1968 Act, maintained that
the judge should conduct the pretrial proceedings to become familiar with the issues
prior to trial. In addition, he stated that in practicing before a master, "you do not get
a judge, you get the judicial determination of a master." 460 F.2d at 356 n.50.
116. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing in Banc at 12.
117. United States v. Bergera, 512 F.2d 391, 393 (9th Cir. 1975); United States
v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1962) (judges tend to forget that the testimony of a
witness presented in an official record may make an impression contrary to that
which was revealed at trial). See also Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974). The
invalidity of a local rule transfering the matter to a magistrate was not cured by its
provision that the judge shall hear the testimony and review de novo since the pro
cedure is not the equivalent of the judge's own exercise of the function as trier of
fact. Id. at 473.
118. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) states:
To experienced lawyers it is commonplace that the outcome of a lawsuit and
hence the vindication of legal rights depends more often on how the fact
finder appraises the facts than on a disputed construction of a statute or in
terpretation of a line of precedents. Thus the procedures by which the facts
of the case are determined assume an importance fully as great as the valid
ity of the substantive rule of law to be applied.
Id. at 520.
119. 603 F.2d at 1255. The major portion of appellant's brief was concerned
not with the magistrate issue, but with substantive allegations against specific rulings
by the magistrate. Brief for Appellant at 34-45.
120. Sick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 592 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1978).
121. Judge Swygert acknowledged the issue, but he did not elaborate on the
matter. 603 F.2d at 1256. See generally Silberman, supra note 60, at 1304-18
nn.42-145; Note, supra note 3, at 1030-37.
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stage of magistrate expansion 122 centering on the delegation of ju
dicial authority to non-article III judges. The major objection is
that magistrates should not exercise the judicial power to preside
over jury trials without the traditional safeguards deemed necessary
to preserve the independence of the judiciary.123 The premise be
hind this objection is that magistrates are materially distinguishable
from article III judges in several critical respects which may influ
ence their ability to perform adjudicatory duties effectively. Unlike
judges, magistrates do not enjoy the protections of life tenure and
undiminishable salary.124 Moreover, differences in the selection
processes, experience and expertise indicate that judges are better
qualified than magistrates in the task of conducting a trial. 125
Three separate lines of analysis have been offered to counter
these concerns. 126 First, the magistrates act merely as an adjunct
of the district court which appoints and exerts control over them.
When a magistrate tries a case, jUrisdiction remains vested in the
district court and is simply exercised through the medium of the
magistrate. While theoretically sound, this argument fails to con
sider the practical problems in devolving such an important task as
presiding at a jury trial. As discussed previously, the actual control
over the magistrate may be less than complete. 127 Second, consent
122. See, e.g., TPO, Inc. v. McMillen, 460 F.2d 348, 352-54 (7th Cir. 1972), for
a survey of judicial and legislative reservations to the 1968 Federal Magistrates Act.
For adverse comment on the 1976 amendments, see H.R. REP., supra note 40, at 8,
reprinted in (1976) 5 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS at 6168. For criticism of the
1979 amendments, see H.R. REP. No. 287, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1979) (dissenting
view of Rep. F. Sensenbrenner, Jr.) ("In my view this bill is unconstitutional.")
123. The waiver of the right to an article III judge is a waiver to the right to an
adjudicator enjoying the constitutional protections of office. Note, supra note 3, at
1030 n.40. Alexander Hamilton noted: "In the general course of human nature, a
power over a man's substance amounts to a power over his will." (emphasis in the
original). THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 497 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). See
also Horton v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403 (1st Cir. 1979). The court
stated that "without questioning the high caliber of magistrates, in this and other cir
cuits, nor the vital function they serve, we cannot ignore that the procedures for ap
pointing and removing magistrates, their tenure, and the part-time status of some of
them materially distinguish magistrates from Article III judges." Id. at 404.
124. Magistrates are appointed by a concurrence of a majority of the district
court's judges, with the primary requirement that appointees be members of the bar
in good standing. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631(a), (b)(l) (1976). See note 146 infra for additional
1979 standards.
125. Note, supra note 3, at 1026 n.18. {"the typical new magistrate would be a
younger lawyer with five to ten years experience....").
126. Hearings on S. 3475 Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judi
cial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 246
(1966) reprinted in TPO, Inc. V. McMillen, 460 F.2d at 353. See also H.R. REP. No.
287, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1979).
127. See notes 102-120 supra and accompanying text.
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is a prerequisite' to invoking magistrate jurisdiction. A voluntary
and knowledgeable consent may mitigate several constitutional con
cerns since the parties waive their right to adjudication before an
article III judge, but this consent is unlikely to be truly volun
tary.128 Third, in all instances, an appeal from a magistrate's deci
sion lies in an article III court. This argument is the most persua
sive since it preserves for the parties the right to a constitutional
judge with life tenure and undiminishable salary.129 As explained
previously,130 however, the scope of the appellate function differs
significantly from that of the trial function. Thus, the problems as
sociated with the use of non-article III judges remain at the trial
stage.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF MAGISTRATE JURY TRIALS

The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the constitutionality
of the magistrate system. The Mathews Court noted,131 but refused
to consider, these broad constitutional issues. As a consequence of
the Supreme Court's silence in this area, analysis has centered
around earlier decisions 132 concerning article I judges to answer
the question of whether article III judges were intended to exer
cise their powers exclusively.133 While factual determinations by
non-article III officers do not impermissibly invade the judicial do
main,134 vigorous opposition has been voiced against delegation of
decisionmaking authority to nonconstitutional judicial officers. 135
As magistrate jurisdiction expands, the Supreme Court un
doubtedly will be forced to decide the parameters of the magis
128. See notes 89-97 S1Jpra and accompanying text.
129. See Silberman, supra note 60, at 1304-21, 1349-60.
130. See notes 112-120 supra and accompanying text.
131. 423 U,S. at 269 n.5.
132. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), This landmark case established
that "there is no requirement that, in order to maintain the essential attributes of
judicial power, all determinations of fact in constitutional courts shall be made by
judges." ld.at 51. See Note, Masters and Magistrates in Federal Courts, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 779, 787-89 (1975). The issue was raised in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S.
530 (1962) (plurality), but was not resolved. The court avoided the question by
deciding that the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals al
ways had been article III courts, ld. at 584.
133. Congress has established specialized 'legislative' courts and other tribu
nals under its article I powers, These officers can preside over cases within the arti
cle III § 2 jurisdictional field. See Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 549-51 (1962).
134. Note, supra note 132, at 787-89.
135. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 606 (1962) (Douglas, L dissenting); See
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 86-87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Cf. Palmore
v. United States, 411 U.S, 389, 407-10 (1974) (judicial and legislative branches did not
intend that all federal trials and decisions would be reserved for article III judges).
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trates' authority.13S Meanwhile, Muhich is a harbinger of future
trends which may modify the entire structure of the federal court
system. The court overcame an invalid local rule and a long tradi
tion restricting magistrate expansion to condone a jury trial pre
sided over by a magistrate. TPO, Inc., 137 Taylor, 138 and United
States v. Raddatz 139 had all previously placed limits on the con
gressional grant of power to magistrates. Yet in Muhich, the Sev
enth Circuit found the combination of consensual reference and de
novo review sufficient to satisfy both statutory and constitutional
challenges. The thrust of Muhich clearly indicates that a strong pol
icy exists supporting the expansion of magistrate jurisdiction from
"super-notary" to "para-judge. "140 Apparently satisfied with the
ability of magistrates to handle judicial matters other than trial,141
the evolution of magistrates into the adjudicatory role seems a logi
cal step in the quest to relieve the overburdened federal court sys
tem. There is, however, an alternative solution to the congestion
problem which precludes several infirmities associated with magis
trate adjudication. The solution is simply to expand magistrate du
ties in discovery, pretrial conferences and other more reviewable
areas, such as evidentiary hearings, while restricting their use as
judicial substitutes at trial. 142 The benefits are three-fold. First,
judges would have more time available to exercise their
adjudicatory roles which was the original rationale for the magis
trate system. Second, this increased specialization in nontrial mat
136. This point may have been reached with the passing of the 1979 Magis
trates Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 631-636 (West Pamph. 1980). The new law gives magis
trates the authority to invalidate state statutes under the constitution. See 125 CONGo
REC. H8,725 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1979) (remarks of Rep. F. Senseubrenner).
In addition, the need for this delegation of judicial power has been seriously
curtailed. In 1979, Congress passed the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C.A.
§§ 44, 133 (West Cum. Supp. 1979), which added 117 new district judgeships. There
is also a bill in Congress to abolish diversity jurisdiction. See H.R. 2202 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979). These measures will curtail the judicial workload and diminish the
need for magistrates to substitute in the presiding of trials.
137. See note 51 supra.
138. See note 17 supra.
139. See note 33 supra.
140. Cf. 423 U.S. at 268. (Supreme Court refused to attach a label to describe
magistrates). There are, however, reservations to this expansion. "[F]inal magistrate
adjudication would also introduce novel problems. It would entail the loss of the
1976 de novo procedure as well as the addition of weaknesses inherent in any sys
tem of consensual reference-risk of coerced consent, role problems, and possible in
hibition of legal development." Note, supra note 3, at 1059.
141. [1979] AD. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 10 (table 10).
142. See Note, supra note 3, at 1061, suggesting a careful restriction of the num
ber of matters in whic~ a magistrate may formally assume the judicial power.
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ters would presumably increase magistrate expertise. Finally, con
stitutional problems, and litigation concerning these, would be
eliminated as moot. Despite this viable alternative, the pro magis
trate expansion trend appears strong enough to continue for the
foreseeable future.
Congress has adopted the pro magistrate expansion policy es
poused in Muhich in the recently passed Federal Magistrates Act
of 1979. 143 The Act expressly allows a district court judge to refer
jury trials to magistrates. 144 District court judges need not support
a magistrate reference under the "additional duties" section of the
Act. Consent stands as the lone threshold to invoking magistrate
jurisdiction, and the Act contains strong warnings to insure the
complete voluntariness of this consent. 145
The magistrate selection process also has been upgraded to in
sure competent magistrates in their new role as adjudicators. 146
The major feature of the 1979 Act empowers magistrates to enter
final judgments which either may be appealed to a higher court or,
if the parties consent,147 to the district court judge. This consti
tutes a major deviation from the Muhich procedure in which the
district court judge retained the ultimate responsibility for the en
try of final judgment through de novo review. This final judgment
feature effectively overrules uniform decisions in the courts of ap
peals 148 which forbid magistrate entry of final judgment. These
143. The 1979 Magistrate Act reads as follows:
(c) Nothwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary
(1) Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate
or a part-time United States magistrate who serves as a full-time
judicial officer may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or non
jury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when
specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district
court....
28 U.S.C.A. § 636(c)(I) (West. Pamph. 1980).
144. [d.
145. 125 CONGo REC. H8,130 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1979). "The conferees felt that
because of the possibility of coercion a strong warning should remain in the legisla
tion that neither the judge nor the magistrate shall attempt to persuade ... any party
to consent...." [d.
146. [d. New positions or reappointments are contingent upon the magistrate
having been a member of the bar of the highest court of his state for at least five
years.
147. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(c)(4) (West Pamph. 1980).
148. Harding V. Kurco, Inc., 603 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1979); Horton V. State St.
Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403 (1st Cir. 1979); Small V. Olympic Prefabricators,
Inc., 588 F.2d 287 (9th Cir. 1978); Cason v. Owen, 578 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1978);
Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978); Sick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 574 F.2d
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cases, like Muhich, considered de novo review essential to comply
with the limitations of Mathews and the Constitution. While the
new Act has not been tested, there are indications from prior deci
sions 149 that the delegation of such a fundamental authority to a
non-article III judge may be improper. The First Circuit has re
cently concluded: "[T]he discretionary authority to enter final judg
ment is so fundamentally an exclusive power of an Article III court
that we are unwilling to find it within the contemplation of this
catch-all, 'additional duties' provision."150 Likewise, the Tenth Cir
cuit has described the final judgment authority as a fundamental
and exclusive power of an article III judge. 151
The crucial constitutional issue concerning the 1979 Act relates
to the source of the judicial reluctance to sanction entry of final
judgment by magistrates. If the reluctance stems from the former
lack of statutory authorization 152 for magistrates to enter final judg
ment, the 1979 Act may prove to be immune from constitutional
attack. If, however, the reluctance is rooted in the constitutional
requirement that the judicial power of the United States shall be
exercised by judges, the Act's constitutional foundation may prove
to be inadequate. As previously shown,153 there are constitutional
reservations to the Muhich procedure. The 1979 Act intensifies the
problems faced in Muhich by eliminating the need for de novo re
view and by allowing magistrates to enter final judgment after
consent by the parties. 154 It is unclear whether the parameters of
689 (2d Cir. 1978); Swanson & Yongdale, Inc. v. Seagrave Corp., 542 F.2d 1008 (8th
Cir. 1976).
149. See note 148 supra. Harding v. Kurco, Inc., 603 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1979).
"Thus, the discretionary authority to direct entry of a final judgment is fundamental
and exclusive power of an Article III judge" Id. at 814. (emphasis added). "[M]ain
taining the integrity of that process requires that magistrates not be allowed to sup
plant judges commissioned under the Constitution in the ultimate adjudication of
controversies." Note, supra note 132, at 803.
ISO. Horton v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 590 F.2d 403, 404 (1st Cir. 1979)
(emphasis added).
151. Harding v. Kurco, Inc., 603 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1979). But see Taylor v.
Oxford, 575 F.2d 152, 154 n.7 (7th Cir. 1978); Sick v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 574 F.2d
689, 691 n.1O (2d Cir. 1978). Both acknowledge legislation in Congress that would
permit final judgment jurisdiction to be exercised by magistrates.
152. The Congress has tacitly admitted the lack of statutory authority in the
former act by its passage of the 1979 Act.
153. See notes 60-130 supra and accompanying text.
154. See H.R. REP. supra note 86, at 38.
The weakness of the logic of those who argue that consent cures all may be
seen when carried to its inevitable conclusion. Under the consent theory,
Congress could abolish all inferior Federal courts ... and replace them with

546

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:523

article III are violated by non-article III judges exercising the
power of article III in the above manner. What is clear is that in
1980, magistrates are performing the traditional judicial function
of presiding at trials without the safeguards deemed essential to an
independent judiciary, as formulated by the framers of the Con
stitution.

V. CONCLUSION
The country is increasingly looking to its federal courts to
solve important and pressing problems. Congestion and delay have
precipitated the need for magistrates to assist the federal judges in
solving these problems. The Muhich court recognized this need
and fashioned a procedure that permits magistrates to preside over
a full jury trial on the merits.
The procedure involves initial consent by the parties pursuant
to a local district rule and a de novo review by the district judge of
any contested findings. Two major problems, one constitutional
and the other practical, emerge from this procedure. The constitu
tional problem is whether article III allows magistrates to exercise
trial jurisdiction in a federal civil case. This infirmity is resolved
when consent is entirely voluntary and the de novo review is exer
cised in a manner which retains the ultimate decisionmaking power
in the judge. The practical problems involve the difficulties in ad
ministering the de novo review and insuring the voluntariness of
consent. The practical problems associated with magistrate jury
trials may not affect the constitutionality of the procedure, but they
do influence the desirability of that process. For example, the time
constraints affecting consent and the various definitions of de novo
review illustrate the difficulties in administering the seemingly sim
ple standards of Muhich. Compounding these problems is the Fed
eral Magistrates Act of 1979. The Act reinforces the Muhich reli
ance on consent, but it exceeds the scope of Muhich by permitting
entry of final judgment by magistrates themselves. The Act inten
sifies the lack of initial access to an article III judge by creating
a new group of judicial officers. Moreover, by eliminating the de
novo review, the Act discards the essential safeguard that the ulti
mate decision for final judgment should remain with a judge proa greatly expanded magistrate system. Litigants who desired a Federal fo
rum would then only have to consent to appear before the magistrate . . .
(or) sue in the State courts. We seriously doubt if the Constitution ever con
templated such a perversion of Article III.
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tected by tenure and salary provisions. A more reasoned
alternative than the Muhich or the 1979 Act's procedures for
solving the problems of congestion and delay would be to increase
the number of district judgeships, as was done in the Omnibus
Judgeship Act of 1978. 155 This increase, combined with the expan
sion of magistrate duties in nontrial areas,156 is preferable for sev
eral reasons. It preserves the integrity of the judicial system by
eliminating non-article III officers from the delicate task of
presiding at jury trials. Also, it eliminates the various problems fre
quently associated with the bifurcated process such as lack of initial
access to a judge and duplicity of work. This approach also pro
vides a direct solution to the congestion problem rather than an in
direct answer through the use of non-article III judges. In the final
analysis, if the country needs additional judges to resolve legal
problems, the solution is to supply more article III judges rather
than "reconditioned" substitutes.
Salvatore D. Ferlazzo
28 U.S.C.A. §§ 44, 133 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
156. See notes 141 & 142 supra and accompanying text.

155.

